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RECENT DECISIONS
Automobiles-Failure to Comply with Statute Requiring a Driver's License
as Evidence of Negligence in a Collision.-Defendant was operating an auto-
mobile owned by another, without a driver's license. The automobile collided
with a bus which was making a left turn at an intersection. In the subsequent
action the court affirmed a finding for the plaintiffs, stating; "Although there
was no direct evidence as to the movements of the automobile before the colli-
sion, the fact that Godfrey (the defendant) was operating it without being
licensed to do so was some evidence that he was operating it negligently....
The manner of operation of the automobile could be found to have had causal
relation to the collision." Keeler v. Godfrey, 308 Mass 573, 33 N.E. (2d) 265
(1941).
The court in the Keller case, in holding that a mere failure to have a
driver's license may be said to be negligence, seems to disregard the fundamental
requirement of causal connection between an injury and alleged negligence, as
set forth in other decisions of the same jurisdiction. The public policy in Massa-
chusetts in regard to the operation of motor vehicles on the highways seems
to have been expressed in a case, not mentioned in the principal case, where
plaintiff brought action for damages sustained when an automobile which one
of them was driving collided with a truck owned by the defendant and operated
by his emloyees, who did not then have a license to operate motor vehicles in
the state. The court therein said, "Operation of an automobile on the public
ways by a person who is not licensed as required by statute, is a crime, and
the violation of the statute is evidence of negligence as to all consequences that
the statute was intended to prevent." Watson v. Forbes, 307 Mass. 383, 30 N.E.
(2d) 228 (1940). But even in the Watson case it was held that the evidence
becomes material only if there is causal connection between the violation of the
statute and the injury that results in the course of the violation.
The Massachusetts statutes in requiring a driver's license merely provide
that no person shall operate a motor vehicle upon any way unless licensed to do
so. 3 Annotated Laws of Massachusetts, c. 90, Sec. 10. The statutes of the
several states which require a driver's license almost unanimously contain a
like provision, stated in the same general way, and do not make any other pro-
vision or further requirement. Some of the particular state statutes will be cited
in the following discussion.
The weight of authority, according to the treatment given it by one text
writer, as to liability based on failure to have a driver's license when one is
required by law, is that it is not a bar to an action for personal injuries or a
defense in such actions. 2 Berry, Law of Automobiles (7th ed. 1935) sec. 2.261.
The absence of a driver's license may be proper evidence, but before it can
afford a basis of liability it must be shown to have been a contributing cause
to the injury. 12 Cyclopedia of Automobile Law (9th ed. 1932) 484, 485;
Prichard v. Collins, 228 Ky. 635, 15 S.W. (2d) 497 (1929), as explained in
Moore v. Hart, 171 Ky. 725, 188 S.W. 861 (1916). Even in Massachusetts it has
been held that the absence of a license, though admissible as evidence of negli-
gence, does not establish liability as a legal result. Kenyon v. Hathaway, 274
Mass. 47, 174 N.E. 463 (1931). The court seems to have entirely overlooked
this point in deciding the principal case.
Cases in other jurisdiction, as well as other cases in Massachusetts, almost
unanimously require a causal connection to be shown between the lack of the
driver's license and the injury complained of. One case goes so far as to limit
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the legislature's power to create a presumption of negligence from a failure to
obtain a driver's license. In this case, an automobile passenger brought action
against a truck owner for injuries sustained when the truck and automobile
collided. The driver of the car in which the plaintiff was riding when the
collision occurred did not have an operator's license. A statute provided, "If
any driver involved in any accident resulting in any damage whatever either
to person or property . . . shall have failed to procure (an) operator's license
. . . he shall be deemed prima fade negligent in causing or contributing to
cause such accident." Ky. Stat. (1936) sec. 2739-62. The court declared that
the mere failure to secure a license could not be stated by statute to be prima
facie evidence of negligence. It is incompetent for legislative bodies to prescribe
a conclusive presumption; and the right to prescribe a rebuttable one is quali-
fied to this extent:-prescribed facts for creating the prima fade presumption
shall have a uatural and rational evidentiary relation to, and a logical tend-
ency to prove, the principal fact. Tipton v. Estill Ice Co., 279 Ky. 793, 132 S.W.
(2d) 347 (1939). It has also been held in Massachusetts that lack of an opera-
tor's license is evidence of negligence, but is not conclusive as to the fact. In
this case where an action was brought for injuries sustained by the driver of
the automobile and the occupants in a collision of the automobile with a parked
truck, the driver of the automobile failing to have an operator's license at the
time of the collision, it was held that negligence consisting in whole or in part
of violation of the law, like other negligence, is without legal consequence
unless it is a contributing cause of the injury. Price v. Pearson, 301 Mass. 260,
16 N.E. (2d) 855 (1938). A case indicating further that failure to have an
operator's license is not conclusive evidence of negligence is one in which
there was action to recover for death caused by an automobile collision. Defend-
ant's loaded truck was driven by his grandson, who possessed a Rhode Island
driver's license, but had no Massachusetts license. The court held that failure
to comply with the law (requiring a Massachusetts driver's license) is evidence
of negligence of the operator to be considered by the jury with other evidence
tending to prove negligence. Kenyon v. Hathaway, supra. Many other cases
decided by this same jurisdiction reiterate the rule that operating a motor
vehicle without a driver's license is only evidence of negligence; see, for exam-
ple. Simon v. Berkshire Street Ry. Co., 298 Mass. 454, 11 N.E. (2d) 485 (1937).
The causal connection between the injury complained of and the alleged
negligence required by most jurisdictions in order to have actionable negligence
must be present whether the lack of a driver's license is interposed by the
adverse party against 1) a defendant driver, 2) a plaintiff driver or 3) a plain-
tiff passenger in a car driven by an unlicensed operator. A case in the first class
above mentioned was an action by a plaintiff for injuries caused by a collision
with an automobile driven by defendant driver who did not have a drivers license.
It was held that the failure to have a driver's license, in violation of a statute,
is not actionable negligence when there is no causal connection behveen the
negligence as alleged in violating the traffic ordinances and the collision causing
the injuries sued for. Aycock v. Peaslee Gaulbert Paint & Varnish Co., 60 Ga.
App. 897, 5 S.E. (2d) 598 (1939). In a case where defendant, a Pennsylvania-
licensed driver, did not have a New York driver's license and drove an auto-
mobile in violation of a statute prohibiting the operation of automobiles by
persons under 18 years of age, it was said that the violation of the statutory
protective requirement is negligence, yet such violation must be a causal factor
of the injury, either to be a basis of recovery to the injured or to constitute
contributory negligence on the part of the violator. Plunkett v. Heath, 1 N.Y.S.
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(2nd) 778 (1938). In an Oregon case the court stated that the defendant was
not negligent because there was no causal connection between the accident and
the driver's failure to have a chauffeur's license. The lack on his part was not
the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. Halsan v. Johnson, 155 Ore. 583,
65 P. (2d) 661 (1937). In this case, the driver did have a driver's license, but
the court in no way indicated that the decision would be any different even
if the operator had had no operator's license of any sort. In Missouri, it has
been held that the charge that a chauffeur had no license was wholly irrelevant,
since it had no causal connection with the accident concerned. Faust v. East
Prairie Milling Co., 20 S.W. (2nd) 918 (Mo. App. 1929).
Mere want of license having no connection with an accident, would not
preclude the operator of a motor vehicle as a plaintiff from recovery. This
doctrine is stated in Price v. Pearson, supra, see also Bourne v. Whitman, 209
Mass. 155, 95 N.E. 404 (1911). In an Iowa case, the plaintiff brought action to
recover damages alleged to have been caused by the negligent parking of
defendant's truck on a public highway. A statute provided that no person
should drive any motor vehicle upon an Iowa highway unless such person had
a valid driver's license. Ia. Code (1939) Chap. 231.1, sec. 5013.01. The accident
causing the damages of which the plaintiff complained occurred while he was
operating his automobile without a driver's license. The court declared that
the mere fact that the operator of a motor vehicle does not have a license
will not bar a recovery for injuries sustained through this negligence unless
there is a causal relation between his failure to comply with the law and the
resulting injuries. Ruckman v. Cudahy Packing Co., 300 N.W. 320 (Ia. 1941).
Causal relationship is also required between the injuries for which the
action is brought and the violation of a statute in failing to have a driver's
license, to preclude from recovery a plaintiff who is injured in an automobile in
which plaintiff is riding, which automobile is driven by an unlicensed operator.
Strandt v. Cannon, 29 Cal. App. (2d) 509, 85 P. (2d) 160 (1939). Where the
driver of an automobile in which the plaintiff's intestate was riding was not
licensed, deceased being killed when the automobile was struck by defendant's
train, it was held by the court that a collateral unlawful act, not contributing to
the injury, will not bar recovery, nor will the fact that the operator of an
automobile had no license, as required by statute, bar a recovery for an injury,
where such failure had no causal connection with the injury. Rose v. Pennsyl-
vania R. Co., 106 N.J.L. 536, 148 Atl. 741 (1930). So also in Iowa where the
driver of the car in which the plaintiff was riding did not have a driver's
license as required by law, it was held that before a violation of the statute
will preclude recovery, causal connection must exist between the unlawful act
and the injuries complained of. Schuster v. Gillispie, 217 Ia. 386, 251 N.W.
735 (1933). To the same effect, even if failure to have a license constitutes
negligence per se, see Jones v. Brookfield Tp., 221 Mich. 235, 190 N.W. 733
(1922).
Although definitely appearing in the minority, some courts hold that failure
to have a driver's license is not even negligence. In some instances, perhaps,
the reason for this conclusion is the wording of the statute requiring a driver's
license, or the absence of any such statute. One court has said that it could
not see how lack of an operator's license in itself could be a proximate cause
of an injury. "Negligence cannot be predicated upon the mere lack of . . . an
operator's license." Opple v. Ray, 208 Ind. 450, 195 N.E. 81 (1935).
The conclusion reached in Ross v. Pennsylvania R. Co., supra, that non-
observance of a statute requiring a driver's license is no evidence of the driver's
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inability to operate a motor vehicle, seems logical. This has been held in several
states. For example, where the statute provided, "No person shall drive any
motor vehicle upon a highway unless he has been licensed as an operator or
chauffeur, or has been granted a temporary instruction or driver's permit by
the "motor vehicle division," Ariz. Rev. Code (1928) sec. 1654, it was held
that the lack of such a license would be no evidence whatever that the driver
was not a capable, skilled and safe one. Lutfy v. Lockhart, 37 Ariz. 488, 295
Pac. 975 (1931). Perhaps due to the apparent policy of the state in regard to
the operation of motor vehicles, the Massachusetts court says on this point
that, although the operation of an automobile is in itself unobjectionable, failure
to have a license is evidence of negligence in reference to fitness to operate a
car, and to skill in the actual management of it. Bourne v. Whitman, supra.
Some courts while conceding that a mere violation of the statute requiring
a driver's license is not negligence per se, have held that it is an 'incident of
negligence." Renner v. Martin, supra. Other courts have held that failure to
have a driver's license is immaterial. For example, the fact that the driver of
the truck in which the plaintiff was riding failed to be licensed was immaterial,
in an action by plaintiff, against the driver of another automobile. Prichard v.
Collins, supra; see also, Mitrovich v. Pavlovich, 114 P. (2nd) 1084 (Nev. 1941);
Moreau v. Garritson, 166 So. 660 (La. App. 1936). The negligence of the opera-
tor is to be determined by the facts existing at the time of the accident, and not
upon whether or not the operator has a driver's license. De Vite v. Connecticut
Co., 112 Conn. 670, 151 Atl. 320 (1930). To the same effect, Strandt v. Cannon,
supra. Although the violation is not evidence of negligence, it has nevertheless
been held by one court to be an independent wrong precluding recovery. John-
son v. Boston & M. R. R., 83 N.H. 350, 143 Atl. 516 (1928).
It is provided in the Wisconsin statutes that, "No person except those herein-
after expressly exempted shall operate any motor vehicle upon a highway in
this state unless such person has a valid license issued under the provisions of
this section." Wis. Stat. (1941) sec. 85.08(3). There are no Wisconsin cases
which can really be considered as decisive of whether a violation of this statute
will influence recovery in an action arising from injuries suffered in an auto-
mobile accident. However it is probable that this jurisdiction would conform
to the weight of authority in requiring some causal connection between the fail-
ure to have a driver's license and an injury complained of, as determined by
the general rules laid down in Osborne v. Montgomery, 203 Wis. 223, 234 N.W.
372 (1931). For liability to result, in an automobile case as in other tort actions,
causal relation must exist between the negligent act and the injury complained of.
If a court wishes to impose liability or preclude recovery for failure to
comply with a licensing statute, an entirely different approach to the problem,
and a seemingly more logical reason than that adopted by the Massachusetts
court, in that which has been adopted by some of the courts, such as New
Hampshire. In considering such a statute this court said, "A licensing statute
creates a new standard of conduct. It makes wrongful an act 'which would not
have been a legal fault per se but for the legislative declaration making it so.'
By it a driver is classified as unfit not because of the way he operates the
car under his control, but 'because he has not taken the prescribed method to
established his fitness in advance'." Thus the legislature in enacting the licensing
statute indicated its intention to impose the civil liability which is thereby
created upon only the particular individual who is personally guilty of violat-
ing its terms. Bowdler v. St. Johnsbury Trucking Co., 90 N.H. 68, 4 A. (2d)
871 (1939).
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